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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses how the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution1 and the preemption rationale associated with the clause im-
pact a state’s ability to either place burdens on, or grant benefits to immi-
grants.  The issue considered is whether a state has the ability to grant a
* Associate Dean, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University;
B.A., J.D., University of Mississippi.  I would like to thank my research assistants, Haley
Reynolds and Brenda Dang, both J.D. candidates 2012, for their help.  I am grateful to my
wife and my children for their moral support while I worked on this Article.
1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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benefit or place a burden on an immigrant without violating the constitu-
tional command that Congress shall have the exclusive power to regulate
immigration.  In certain situations, state regulations requiring local law
enforcement officers to inquire about a person’s federal immigration sta-
tus have been interpreted as an unconstitutional effort by local officials to
regulate immigration.2  This proposition flows from the understanding
that those who are not citizens of the United States may be considered
aliens.3
The relationship between the federal government and immigration is
based on an 1889 California case involving Chinese laborers, where the
Supreme Court said that because of the long-established constitutional
arrangement that only Congress can exclude aliens from the United
States, it should no longer be considered a debatable rule of law.4  Under
our Constitution, the states are given the ability to regulate local affairs
through the efforts of local officials; however, regarding immigration is-
sues, states are bound as a single nation united under federal law.5  State
laws regulating immigration, which violate or contradict the U.S. Consti-
tution and other federal laws are absolutely void.6  Congress is granted
the exclusive right to permit immigrants to remain in the country whether
they are characterized as undocumented aliens or documented aliens.7
Congress also possesses an exclusive “right to provide a system of regis-
tration and identification” for all immigrants in the country.8
2. See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 344, 346 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted,
565 U.S. __ (2011) (introducing the claim that Arizona’s new immigration law “was pre-
empted by the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and that it violated the Com-
merce Clause”).
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion
Case), 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889); see Freddy Funes, Beyond the Plenary Power Doctrine:
How Critical Race Theory Can Help Move Us Past The Chinese Exclusion Case, Note, 11
SCHOLAR 341, 341–47 (2009) (describing the history of immigration policies towards the
Chinese in California during the 1800s).
4. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 603.
5. Id. at 604–06 (“For local interests the several States of the Union exist, but for
national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people,
one nation, one power.”).
6. See id. at 605 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 413 (1821)) (“The constitu-
tion and laws of a State, so far as they are repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the
United States, are absolutely void.”).  The Court reasoned that as a nation, the United
States has a duty to maintain security and independence, and “nearly all other considera-
tions are to be subordinated.” Id. at 606.  To this end, foreign aggression and encroach-
ment, whether through acts of open warfare or “from vast hordes of its people crowding in
upon [the United States,]” calls for unified action, rather than piecemeal efforts from indi-
vidual states. Id.
7. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 714 (1893).
8. Id.  The Court concluded that although immigration duties may be carried out by
all three branches, ultimately, “[t]he power to exclude aliens, and the power to expel them,
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The enactment of laws regarding the entrance of immigrants from for-
eign nations to an American land of opportunity is possessed by Congress
alone and not by an individual state or a group of states.  In America,
only Congress, as the representative of our national government, has the
power to regulate immigrants from foreign nations.9  If this was not so, an
individual state, acting on its own, without any consideration of congres-
sional intent could entangle the United States in unfortunate and often
unavoidable disagreements with other nations, by means of a single state
law.10  Because there are many excellent grounds demonstrating the need
for the United States of America to speak as one voice on the issue of
immigration, state laws regulating immigration without the consent of
Congress should be considered a violation of the U.S. Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause.11  In a 1941 decision challenging the validity of the
Alien Registration Act approved by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
Justice Black said the supremacy of the national power regulating immi-
gration was recognized by the authors of the Federalist Papers in 1787.12
rest upon [Congress] . . . .” Id. at 713.  Furthermore, a California law burdening the rights
of Chinese people as immigrants in America was properly held to be unconstitutional and
void because it was preempted by the congressional power to regulate commerce with
other countries.  Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1876).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–63 (1941).
12. Id. at 59, 64.  “The importance of national power in all matters relating to foreign
affairs and the inherent danger of state action” involving the subject of immigration are
described and made clear “in the Federalist Papers No. 3, 4, 5, 42 and 80.” Id. at 63 n.9.
Hamilton writes that “the peace of the whole ought not to be left at the disposal of a part.
The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its mem-
bers.  And the responsibility for an injury ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty of
preventing it.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).  In the Federalist Paper
No. 42, Madison writes:
If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other
nations.
. . . .
The dissimilarity in the rules of naturalization has long been remarked as a fault in our
system, and as laying a foundation for intricate and delicate questions.  By the laws of
several States, certain descriptions of aliens, who had rendered themselves obnoxious,
were laid under interdicts inconsistent not only with the rights of citizenship but with
the privilege of residence.  What would have been the consequence, if such persons, by
residence or otherwise, had acquired the character of citizens under the law of another
State, and then asserted their rights as such, both to residence and citizenship, within
the State proscribing them?  Whatever the legal consequences might have been, other
consequences would probably have resulted, of too serious a nature not to be pro-
vided against.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).  Likewise in the Federalist Papers Nos. 3, 4, and
5, John Jay warns against the inherent difficulties of implementation of multiple foreign
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In 2010, Arizona adopted Senate Bill 1070 (S.B. 1070).13  Senate Bill
1070’s creation of new immigration-related crimes under state law was
immediately explosive and very controversial, provoking intense debates
on America’s modern immigration law and policy.14  Some commentators
contend that the Constitution and federal law do not authorize an assort-
ment of state and local immigration guidelines throughout the nation.15
Furthermore, they argue that because Arizona intends to use S.B. 1070 to
construct its own immigration policy and enforce state laws that unneces-
sarily burden federal immigration law, the state crossed the constitutional
preemption line.16  Arizona’s S.B. 1070, as initially passed required police
to check a person’s immigration status upon any “stop, detention, or ar-
rest . . . where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and
is unlawfully present in the United States.”17  The Arizona law demon-
strates that noncompliance with the Supremacy Clause preemption ratio-
nale on the federal immigration issue is constitutionally problematic for
states attempting to regulate immigration, primarily because these state
policies challenge established federal immigration policies without ex-
policies of the individual states, as well as the negative image such potentially conflicting
policies would convey to other nations. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 3, 4, 5 (John Jay).
13. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), enrolled as amended by H.B. 2162,
49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).  Although the House Bill made slight changes to the
language of S.B. 1070, the popular press refers to the enacted legislation as S.B. 1070 as do
I throughout this Article.
14. Gabriel J. Chin et al., A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona Senate Bill
1070, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47, 48 (2010).
15. Id. at 81 (2010).  To support their point the authors quote from the United States
Department of Justice’s brief submitted to the Arizona District Court:
The Constitution and federal law do not permit the development of a patchwork of
state and local immigration policies throughout the country.  Although a state may
adopt regulations that have an indirect or incidental effect on aliens, a state may not
establish its own immigration policy or enforce state laws in a manner that interferes
with federal immigration law.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof
at 1, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-1413-
NVW), 2010 WL 29593635; Chin et al., supra note 14, at 81.
16. Chin et al., supra note 14, at 81.  The Arizona law is said to potentially implicate
the basic doctrinal variation on federal preemption, “field preemption,” in which “the
breadth and depth of federal action indicates an intention to occupy to the field to the
exclusion of the states” and another form of implied preemption in which compliance with
both the state and federal law would be impossible. Id.
17. S.B. 1070, art. 8B, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), amended by H.B. 2162,
sec. 3B, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).  The House Bill was signed into law by the
Governor of Arizona on April 30, 2010, amending Section 11-1051 of the Arizona Revised
Statutes.  H.B. 2162, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
2012] SUPREMACY CLAUSE 683
press congressional consent.18  On the other hand, a very recent Supreme
Court decision originating in Arizona demonstrates that while states can-
not directly take it upon themselves to regulate or enforce immigration
they may play a role in regulating the employment activities of immi-
grants with the permission of Congress.19
Professor Haynes contends that as a result of legal uncertainty, it is not
a shocking revelation that the states have advised the U.S. government
that if it fails to provide services to undocumented immigrants, then the
states will be forced to enact state and local laws regulating the rights of
immigrants.20  Even if America’s weak enforcement of national immigra-
tion policy creates public frustration21 that fact does not grant each state
a green light to use the politics of fear22 to implement its own local immi-
gration laws without first demonstrating that a local immigration rule is
consistent with a purpose of Congress.23
Congressional intent is the decisive issue in all preemption cases in-
cluding immigration issues.24  The Naturalization Clause prohibits a state
from having a unilateral role in the field of immigration because the Nat-
uralization Clause’s grant of exclusive immigration power to Congress is
a historical recognition of the inherent need for the nation to speak with
18. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 346 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 565
U.S. __ (2011).
19. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 563 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct.
1968, 1973 (2011).
20. Dina Francesca Haynes, Crossing the Border: The Future of Immigration Law and
Its Impact on Lawyers, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 301, 303 (2011).
21. See Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 858, 864
(N.D. Tex. 2008) (recognizing citizen frustration over the refusal of government to enforce
a certain ordinance on immigration, but admitting that frustration does not automatically
deem the ordinance constitutional).
22. Bill Ong Hing, Reason over Hysteria, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 275, 297 (2011).
According to Professor Hing:
The anti-immigrant lobby has used the politics of fear to generate much of the hysteria
over immigration today.  They advance the image of hordes of immigrants coming
from Asia and Latin America to take our jobs and commit crimes, all the while not
wanting to speak English.  Through fear and intimidation, comprehensive immigration
reform has been stalled.
Id.
23. Cf. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 488–90 (1996) (determining that defen-
dant-company’s argument must fail, because to interpret the statute otherwise would
“produc[e] a serious intrusion into state sovereignty while simultaneously wiping out the
possibility of remedy for the [plaintiff] Lohrs’ alleged injuries”).  In this case, the Court
examined the legislative purpose and the history of the legislation, because the actual
wording of the statute was ambiguous. Id. at 505.
24. See Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963) (“The purpose of Con-
gress is the ultimate touchstone . . . and may displace state power or it may even by silence
indicate a purpose to let state regulation be imposed on the federal regime.”).
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one voice on immigration issues.  In an anti-immigrant tenant regulation
case compelling tenants to comply with proof of citizenship or eligible
immigration status before signing leasing agreements, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas communicated its aware-
ness of the ordinance’s extensive media coverage and popular support,
locally and nationally.25  Even as the court attached importance to the
frustration of citizens and local public officials about the failure of federal
officials to apply or implement federal immigration laws, the court said
that “the ‘will of the people’ in endorsing the Ordinance does not bestow
the imprimatur of constitutionality on the Ordinance.”26  The court fur-
ther describes the impropriety of lending judicial authority on the basis of
political popularity.27  A court that does so abandons its judicial duty to
determine whether the anti-immigration law is permitted under the pre-
emption rationale, which is an intrinsic part of the Naturalization Clause
of the Constitution.28  The situation of a state or local statute’s potential
trespass into federal law which enjoys political popularity cannot insulate
it from a court’s finding of unconstitutionality.29
A popular justification for local laws regulating immigration is that fed-
eral immigration law is too dysfunctional to be effective—Professor Oli-
vas correctly believes that a proliferation of local anti-immigration laws
that overlap with federal immigration would be equally dysfunctional.30  I
am a supporter of federal immigration reform, but until progressive fed-
eral immigration reform is implemented, having one dysfunctional fed-
eral immigration system is a lesser evil than having fifty or more
dysfunctional immigration policies driving America.31  In this global
economy, a number of communities throughout America have separate
but unequal housing ordinances that target undocumented immigrants;32
25. Villas at Parkside Partners, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 861–62, 864.
26. Id. at 864.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption,
Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 53 (2007).
31. See id. (discussing the confusing “checkerboard” jurisdictional system that would
result if states were allowed to enact their own separate immigration policies).
32. See generally Daniel Eduardo Guzma´n, Note, “There Be No Shelter Here”: Anti-
Immigrant Housing Ordinances and Comprehensive Reform, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 399 (2010) (examining both the explicit and the facially neutral municipality ordi-
nances used to target undocumented immigrants).  An example of such an ordinance
would be one which prohibits congregating at day labor centers or which discourages the
use of any language other than English. Id. at 401.  The Illegal Immigration Relief Act
Ordinance, passed in 2006 by the city of Hazelton, Pennsylvania, is perhaps one of the
most notorious of these ordinances, prohibiting “employing, harboring, and housing un-
documented immigrants, and which made English the ‘official language’ of the city.” Id.
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this undermines the role of Congress in regulating commerce with foreign
nations33 and in establishing uniform rules for immigration.34
Part II of this Article discusses the historical and continuing tension
between a state’s desire to control the rights of immigrants as a local issue
and the Constitution’s grant of power to Congress to regulate immigra-
tion as a national foreign policy issue.  Part III discusses why immigration
is inherently linked to foreign policy and why the preemption rationale
applies to state and local regulations that substantially interfere with the
life of any immigrant present in a community because of the potential
impact on America’s global interest.  Part IV presents an analysis of the
preemption issue where state laws or policies relating to immigrants are
in conformity with the Supremacy Clause.  For instance in Martinez v.
Regents of the University of California,35 the California Supreme Court
held a California law exempting specific undocumented immigrants from
paying nonresident tuition and fees at state colleges and universities does
not violate the preemption doctrine because the state law does not regu-
late immigration.36  Similarly, in the Supreme Court, the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States v. Whiting37 decision is an example of the
state of Arizona regulating the employment status of immigrants in con-
formity with the Supremacy Clause because Arizona’s law conforms to
the intent of Congress.38  Part IV also analyzes the rationale of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Whiting.  Part V highlights the United States v. Ari-
Both the district court and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held the Ordinance to be
unconstitutional in violation of the Supremacy Clause.  Logan Burruss, U.S. Circuit Court
Rules Against Illegal Immigration Laws, CNN (Sept. 10, 2010, 9:58 AM), http://
www.cnn.com/2010/US/09/09/pennsylvania.immigration.case/index.html.  Certiorari was
granted by the U.S. Supreme Court but then vacated and remanded back to the Third
Circuit for determination in accordance with the Court’s finding in Chamber of Commerce
of the United States v. Whiting, 563 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011).  City of Hazelton
v. Lozano, 563 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011).
33. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  The U.S. Constitution gives to Congress
the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among several States, and
with the Indian Tribes.” Id. This power is not limited to only relations between sovereign
nations, for the Court has since interpreted that “[c]ommerce with foreign nations, without
doubt, means commerce between citizens of the United States and citizens or subjects of
foreign governments, as individuals.”  United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 417 (1865).
34. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (giving Congress the power “[t]o estab-
lish an uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . ”).
35. 241 P.3d 855 (2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2961 (2011).
36. Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 861–62 (2010), cert. denied,
563 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2961 (2011).
37. 563 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
38. See Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 563 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct.
1968, 1986 (2011) (identifying Arizona’s requirement to have employers use the E-Verify
system as amenable with Congress’s authorization in the development of the E-Verify
program).
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zona39 opinion as an example of a state law violating the law of preemp-
tion by regulating immigration independent of the federal approval.  The
Article concludes by explaining that lack of congressional intent on the
issue of regulating immigration does not by default create a state right to
regulate immigration because immigration is by its very nature foreign
policy.
II. THE HISTORICAL AND CONTINUING TENSION BETWEEN A STATE’S
DESIRE TO CONTROL THE RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANTS AS A LOCAL ISSUE
AND THE CONSTITUTION’S GRANT OF POWER TO CONGRESS TO
REGULATE IMMIGRATION AS A NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE
At the very beginning of this country’s existence, the colonies and
states controlled immigration law.40  According to Professor Juliet P.
Stumpf, except for two constitutionally-suspect federal statutes enacted in
1798,41 state and local regulations were the only type of immigration rules
to exist in America’s first century as a nation.42  Regulations imple-
mented by local public officials to oppose immigrants represent an origi-
nal American national perspective for many.43  In fact, the original
thirteen colonies made an effort to segregate on the basis of nationality
by offering preferred immigration status to exclusive groups.44  Benjamin
Franklin was against the admission of Germans into Pennsylvania,45
while George Washington was an advocate of a very inclusive immigra-
tion policy that was reflected in “the first federal immigration law in the
United States.”46  The United States enacted its first immigration statute
in 1790, which officially transferred the subject of immigration from state
39. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 565 U.S. __
(2011).
40. Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over Im-
migration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1564 (2008).  One of the earliest examples of a classic
immigration law within the United States was the order of the General Court of Massachu-
setts, issued in 1637, forbidding settlement within a town without official permission. Id.
41. Id. at 1566 (citing the Alien Enemy Act of 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24 (2000))) (providing for removal of aliens from countries at
war with the United States when the president deems such an alien to be a danger to the
United States). See Alien Act of 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (granting the president the exclu-
sive power to expel even friendly aliens).  The Alien Act expired in 1800.
42. Stumpf, supra note 40, at 1566 (citing GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE
CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 19–20 (1996)).
43. Ong Hing, supra note 22, at 277.
44. Id.  The colonies also enacted laws prohibiting immigration based on race, socio-
economic status and religion. Id.
45. Id.
46. Kevin J. Fandl, Immigration Posses: U.S. Immigration Law and Local Enforce-
ment Practices, 34 J. LEGIS. 16, 17 (2008).
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and local control to federal dominion with the adoption of a uniform rule
of naturalization.47
Nevertheless, many states in the twenty-first century enacted statutes
designed to control immigration locally.48  It is the contention of one
scholar that the first ten years of the twenty-first century provided a harsh
reality check for all immigrants living in the United States regardless of
whether the immigrant was classified as documented or undocumented.49
As a result of the lack of needed sweeping federal immigration upgrades,
many states and municipalities enacted an assortment of local ordinances,
statutes, and ballot initiatives to regulate the immigration issues facing
their local community.50  As the economy struggles to emerge from the
most recent downturn, the debate as to whether the existence of immi-
grants in the United States is a benefit or burden on our national econ-
omy becomes a starting place for intense debate regarding immigration
policy.51
Since the United States approved its federal immigration law in 1790,52
U.S. immigration law has consistently been recognized as being under the
jurisdiction of federal law, superseding any state or local legislation that
conflicts with established national laws.53  In the 1849 Passenger Cases,54
the Supreme Court held that the power to regulate immigration belongs
exclusively to Congress.55  Over a century later in the 1976 De Canas v.
47. Id.
48. Kristina M. Campbell, Imagining a More Humane Immigration Policy in the Age
of Obama: The Use of Plenary Power to Halt the State Balkanization of Immigration Regu-
lation, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 415, 415 (2010).
49. Id. at 449.
50. Id. at 415.
51. Id.
52. Fandl, supra note 46.
53. Id. at 20; see, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354-55 (1976) (“Power to regu-
late immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893) (“‘[E]very sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in
sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within
its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see
fit to prescribe.’”) (quoting Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892));
Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1876) (holding that keeping immigration law
within the control of the federal government aids in preventing clashes between individual
states and foreign nations); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 266, 271 (1876)
(questioning “whether the act assumes to regulate commerce between the port of New
York and foreign ports, and is unconstitutional” and holding that it was not in conflict
because it was within the state’s police powers); Smith v. City of Boston (Passenger Cases),
48 U.S. 283, 283 (1849) (considering a challenge against state statutes taxing alien travelers
entering that state’s ports).
54. 48 U.S. 283 (1849).
55. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 464.
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Bica56 opinion, the Supreme Court took the position that not “every state
enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigra-
tion and thus per se preempted by this constitutional power . . . .”57  Since
not every law passed by a state or local government regarding immigrants
is preempted by federal law, the historical tensions between the federal
government regulatory power regarding immigrants and a state’s right to
enact laws impacting immigrants is not easily resolved when Congress has
failed to expressly state its intent to preempt because the purpose of Con-
gress is the basis of any preemption analysis.58
In 1876, the Supreme Court held in Chy Lung v. Freeman59 that a Cali-
fornia statute designed to obtain money under duress from foreign pas-
sengers by denying access to the United States by way of California was
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.  The plaintiff, a citizen of
the Emperor of China, was a passenger on a boat from China and became
a prisoner of the state of California because the owner or operator of the
boat that transported her to the shores of California declined to provide a
bond (as required under a California statute) in the amount of five hun-
dred dollars in gold “to indemnify all the counties, towns, and cities of
California against liability for her support or maintenance for two
years.”60  The Court’s decision described the California law as a very ex-
traordinary law61 because it gave a single state official the power to pre-
vent boats engaged in foreign trade between China and the United States
from transporting immigration passengers unless the Chinese merchants
“submit[ted] to systematic extortion of the grossest kind.”62
56. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
57. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355.
58. See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (reiterating that pre-
emption analysis begins with the purpose of Congress).  A state’s authority may be pre-
empted by Congress when provided statutorily in clear and express terms. Id.  However,
clear and express language is not the only means by which Congress may preempt a state’s
authority.  Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461
U.S. 190, 203 (1983).
Absent explicit pre-emptive language, Congress’ intent to supersede state law alto-
gether may be found from a scheme of federal regulation . . .  so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room to supplement it, because the Act
of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject, or because the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the charac-
ter of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.
Id. at 203–04 (internal quotations omitted).
59. 92 U.S. at 275 (1876).
60. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 276 (1876).
61. Id. at 277.
62. Id. at 278.
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The power to extort money from Chinese nationals under the Califor-
nia statute was an unconstitutional exercise of power that could likely
create conflict with China under the Commerce Clause, and only Con-
gress possesses the authority to control commerce with foreign nations.63
In Chy Lung, the Supreme Court said that it was not deciding whether
the state of California had the right “in the absence of legislation by Con-
gress, to protect herself by necessary and proper laws against paupers and
convicted criminals from abroad.”64  This suggested that in appropriate
circumstances, a state may demonstrate a vital necessity to exercise the
right to protect itself from convicted criminals and paupers from foreign
nations when Congress has not addressed the issue with federal legisla-
tion.65  The California law in Chy Lung exceeded what was necessary, or
even appropriate, to protect the state against an influx of poor immi-
grants or the entrance of immigrants with criminal convictions; the Cali-
fornia immigrant-exploitation law’s manifest purpose was not to obtain
indemnity for reasonably foreseeable economic losses caused by immi-
grants, but to make money for the state of California at the potential
expense of the federal government’s right to regulate foreign affairs.66
The preemption rule as a guiding rationale is embedded in the Supremacy
Clause,67 and that rationale, by implication, renders all state or local laws
invalid which interfere with, or conflict with, the federal government’s
explicit power to regulate foreign affairs.68
During the same term of October 1875, the Court heard a case involv-
ing citizens from Great Britain.  In Henderson v. Mayor of New York,69
owners of a steamship named Ethiopia which came to the port of New
York from Glasgow, Scotland on June 24, 1875, transporting passengers
successfully challenged a New York law requiring ship owners from a for-
eign port to post bonds for their foreign passengers within twenty-four
63. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States . . . ”); see also Chy Lung, 92
U.S. at 280 (holding a California statute unconstitutional because it was a regulation of
commerce, a duty belonging only to the U.S. Congress).
64. Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 280.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Rose Cuison Villazor, Rediscovering Oyama v. California: At the Intersection of
Property, Race, and Citizenship, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 979, 1033–34 (2010).  In Oyama,
Japanese citizen Kajiro Oyama passed a land deed to his American-born son Fred Oyama,
but California petitioned for escheat on that land due to California Alien Land Laws.
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 636–37 (1948).  The Court held that the law did not
deprive Fred Oyama of any constitutional guarantees “since the land had passed to the
State without ever vesting in him.” Id. at 639–40.
69. 92 U.S. 259, 267 (1876).
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hours of their arrival.70  The ship owners were required to give a bond for
every foreign passenger to indemnify the Commissioners of Emigration,
and every county, city, and town in the state of New York against any
expense for the relief or support of the person named in the bond for the
next four years; however, a ship owner could avoid posting the bond by
paying for each passenger, within twenty-four hours after his or her land-
ing, “the sum of one dollar and fifty cents.”71  Similar to Chy Lung, the
law was held to be unconstitutional because it interfered with the right of
Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the
states.72  The New York law demanding bonds or a tax for passengers
from a foreign nation was also held to violate the Constitution’s Im-
port–Export clause,73 which prohibits states from imposing import or ex-
port taxes without the consent of Congress.74  The Supreme Court
properly rejected New York’s contention that the purpose of its bond law
was “to protect the State against the consequences of the flood of pauper-
ism immigrating from Europe and first landing in that city” because the
bond requirement operated as an unreasonable tax on every passenger
who came from abroad regardless of his socio-economic status.75
The New York bond requirement law was in effect a tax on immigrants;
a person who added to the wealth of the United States of America and
was free from any disease was subject to the same tax as an unhealthy,
poor person who was at risk of needing help from the city of New York
on the same day the ship landed.76  Congress, under authority of the Con-
70. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 265, 269 (1876).
71. Id. at 267.  Under the New York Act of 1849, the carrier of passengers from a
foreign port were required to provide a $300 indemnity bond with sureties and a continu-
ing liability for four years to the State of New York for each passenger not a United States
citizen after arriving in New York, regardless of whether the passenger intended to remain
in the State or was simply traveling through New York without delay and on his way to
another state or country. Id.
72. Id. at 270–71.
73. Id. at 269.
74. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.  “No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress,
lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary
for executing its inspection Laws . . . .” Id.
75. See Henderson, 92 U.S. at 269 (discussing taxing of foreigners immigrating to the
United States).  The Supreme Court believed it was strange to tax all individuals the same
and noted that:
The man who brings with him important additions to the wealth of the country, and
the man who is perfectly free from disease, and brings to aid the industry of the coun-
try a stout heart and a strong arm, are as much the subject of the tax as the diseased
pauper who may become the object of the charity of the city the day after he lands
from the vessel.
Id.
76. Id.
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stitution, is given the ability to regulate immigrant passengers coming to
America77 because these rules directly involve international relations
under the Commerce Clause.78  Courts have historically employed the
preemption doctrine to invalidate state and local laws that try to regulate
immigration because those laws have a tendency to weaken Congress’s
sole authority to regulate both immigration and commerce with other for-
eign nations.79
A regulation by a state or local official that imposes heavy burdens on
those involved in commerce with foreign nations is, by necessity, national
in its character and must be regulated by the federal government.80  Simi-
larly, regulations that impose heavy burdens on immigrants living in the
United States seeking to rent a home or seeking employment even if it
involves intrastate commerce are also considered national in character
and are regulated by the federal government because any local laws en-
acted on the subject are likely to have an inherent impact on the United
States’ international relationship with other countries.81  When a state en-
acts laws that impact immigration, the assumption of non-preemption
does not work in favor of the state because of the history of considerable
federal authority in regulating both commerce and immigration.82  For
more than one hundred years, the Supreme Court has consistently main-
tained that there is no conceivable topic where the legislative power of
Congress is more complete than the regulation of immigration.83
77. Id. at 270.
78. Id. at 272–73.
79. Cuison Villazor, supra note 68, at 1034.
80. Henderson, 92 U.S. at 273.
81. See id. (illustrating that national and international issues lie clearly within the ju-
risdiction of Congress).  Writing for the Court, Justice Miller stated as follows:
A regulation which imposes onerous, perhaps impossible, conditions on those engaged
in active commerce with foreign nations, must of necessity be national in its character.
It is more than this; for it may properly be called international.  It belongs to that class
of laws which concern the exterior relation of this whole nation with other nations and
governments.  If our government should make the restrictions of these burdens on
commerce the subject of a treaty, there could be no doubt that such a treaty would fall
within the power conferred on the President and the Senate by the Constitution.
Id.
82. Fonseca v. Fong, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 567, 574 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
83. Id.  “As the Supreme Court has repeatedly said, ‘over no conceivable subject is
the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over’ the admission of aliens.”
Id. (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)).
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III. BECAUSE IMMIGRATION IS INHERENTLY LINKED TO FOREIGN
POLICY, THE PREEMPTION RATIONALE APPLIES TO STATE AND LOCAL
REGULATIONS THAT SUBSTANTIALLY INTERFERE WITH THE LIFE OF
ANY IMMIGRANT PRESENT IN A COMMUNITY BECAUSE OF THE
POTENTIAL IMPACT ON AMERICA’S GLOBAL INTERESTS
While comprehensive immigration reform is certainly necessary and
proper, an individual state is preempted from enacting these needed re-
forms because the duty to transform the nation’s immigration laws is as-
signed to both Congress and the President.84  Professor Michael Olivas
has correctly rejected Professor Spiro’s argument that the preemption
doctrine is weak and outdated by refuting Spiro’s flawed conclusion that
when the immigration issue is viewed through a foreign policy lens, it “no
longer remains an exclusive federal responsibility.”85
Actually, there is an increasing need for expanding the preemption ra-
tionale in those circumstances that impact U.S. immigration policy since
immigration is an international issue that impacts globalization.86  Profes-
sor Spiro and his supporters advocate a retreat from uniform federal reg-
ulation of immigration in favor of aggressive enforcement of immigration
by state and local government, overlooking the clear and unmistakable
need for a strong federal preemptive role in a global economy.87  If the
United States is to have an effective role as a global leader in the global
economy, it is not appropriate to decrease the preemptive role of the fed-
eral government in the field of immigration while assigning an expanding
power of state and local officials to regulate the complex field of
immigration.88
84. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).  “[T]he responsibility for regulating the
relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the
political branches of the Federal Government.” Id.
85. Olivas, supra note 30, at 29.  Professor Olivas reasons that:
The problem with . . . this entire line of reasoning, is that there is no compelling reason
to discard the preemption power, as it retains its common law and statutory vitality;
the premises behind the state preclusion/state rights equation are not as one-sided as
Spiro (or restrictionists, generally) would have us believe; and the momentum of
“demi-sovereignties” runs in the opposite direction, that is, it is not the individual
[fifty] states that are shedding their traditional place in federalism’s constitutional ar-
rangement, rather it is the nation–state repositioning itself in regional, transnational,
multilateral compacts and arrangements between and among nations that is evident in
the world polity.
Id.
86. Id. (arguing “the internationalization of the United States and world economies”
makes preemption even more vital in this framework).
87. Id. at 29–30.
88. Id. at 29.  “I concluded then, and still believe, that ‘[p]reemption, for all its detri-
ments and foolish inconsistencies, is the devil we know.  A postmodern state cannot coexist
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Conversely, Professor Rigel C. Oliveri’s lack of faith in preemption as
an effective tool to protect immigrants from state and local anti-immigra-
tion laws that attempt to regulate immigration without the express per-
mission is not properly justified.89  Professor Oliveri believes that
“preemption is a risky and unsatisfying” line of attack against local anti-
immigrant regulations because future courts may not find these, or simi-
lar anti-immigration ordinances, preempted under the federal standard.90
It is my position that Professor Oliveri’s rationale for rejecting preemp-
tion as an effective tool for attacking anti-immigrant housing regulations
and other attempts to regulate immigration should be rejected.91  This is
so because there is never a guarantee that any court interpreting the dy-
namic federal Constitution will, due to public policy considerations, con-
strue any constitutional provision the same, even if the facts presented
are identical.  A state’s traditional police power in either housing or em-
ployment is not an adequate justification for a state to unilaterally deter-
mine the conditions under which an immigrant remains in the United
States.92
with medieval constructs.’” Id. (citing Michael A. Olivas, Comment, Preempting Preemp-
tion: Foreign Affairs, State Rights, and Alienage Classifications, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 217, 236
(1994)).
89. See Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-
Illegal Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 55, 68 (2009)
(explaining why preemption is “a risky and unsatisfying approach”).
90. See id. at 68–69 (2009) (discussing the issues with relying on express field preemp-
tion, implied field preemption and conflict preemption in attacking AIHOs).  In Professor
Oliveri’s view:
Whether because of political gridlock, the complexity of the issue, or the enormity of
the problem, the federal government has not effectively prevented unauthorized peo-
ple from entering the country or removed those who do.  Meanwhile, local communi-
ties are faced with the practical task of absorbing influxes of immigrants, legal and
otherwise.  The community’s housing stock, schools, workplaces, and hospitals are di-
rectly affected by such demographic changes.  As a result, local governments will inva-
riably continue to take action[—] in ways that may be either pro-or anti-immigrant.  In
light of this reality, it is unsatisfying to dismiss these attempts as being outside the
constitutional scope of their powers.
Id. at 70.
91. See id. at 72 (discussing the idea that scholars should instead focus on the “sub-
stantive issues raised by these ordinances”).
92. See Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why In-
viting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 965, 987–91 (2004) (contending that the immigration power belongs exclusively to the
federal government and that it should be implemented uniformly).  Pham argues:
The Constitution requires uniform enforcement in immigration laws because the im-
migration power is an exclusively federal power that must be exercised uniformly.
This conclusion is compelled by an examination of the sources of the immigration
power, as well as by the power’s inextricable foreign policy implications.  Moreover,
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If a state may deny a person housing based upon its independent deter-
mination of immigration status, it essentially determines that an immi-
grant can remain in a specific local community within the United States
only if willing to be homeless, which is both inhumane and violates the
constitutional command of De Canas v. Bica.93  The Supreme Court has
held that state and local governments cannot independently regulate im-
migration by determining under what terms and conditions a person re-
mains in the United States, regardless of whether those terms and
conditions are reasonable.94  When county or city anti-immigrant housing
ordinances (AIHOs) deny an immigrant the right to lease a home or
apartment because of immigration status, the local law creates an unrea-
sonable burden in the terms and conditions under which a person may
remain in the United States.  Federal immigration status can only be de-
cided by federal authorities and should be preempted because only the
federal government can regulate immigration.95
To undo the regulatory effects of AIHOs, courts predominantly utilize
the legal doctrine of preemption.96  I take the position that the preemp-
the constitutional mandate for uniformity requires uniform enforcement, as well as
uniform laws, because in the immigration law context, non[-]uniform enforcement has
the same negative effect as non[-]uniform laws and implicates the same foreign policy
concerns.
Id. at 987.
93. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976) (“Power to regulate immigration is
unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”).  The Court noted that there are times when,
although a state regulation may be “harmonious with federal regulation” the Supremacy
Clause nonetheless requires invalidation. Id. at 356.
94. Id. at 358.  “[E]ven absent such a manifestation of congressional intent to ‘occupy
the field,’ the Supremacy Clause requires the invalidation of any state legislation that bur-
dens or conflicts in any manner with any federal laws or treaties.” Id. at 358 n.5.
95. See id. at 351, 358 n.6 (discussing laws which are impermissible if they impose
burdens “not contemplated by Congress”)  The Court adds:
The Federal Government has broad constitutional powers in determining what aliens
shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may remain, regulation of their
conduct before naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization.
Under the Constitution the states are granted no such powers; they can neither add to
nor take from the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, naturaliza-
tion and residence of aliens in the United States or the several states.  State laws which
impose discriminatory burdens upon the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully
within the United States conflict with this constitutionally derived federal power to
regulate immigration, and have accordingly been held invalid.
Id. (quoting Torao Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948)) (internal
citations omitted).
96. See Guzma´n, supra note 32, at 405 (advocating in favor of the preemption doctrine
presenting a strong argument to be used to attack AIHOs).  The author also notes that
“[p]laintiffs have successfully argued federal preemption of AIHOs in four municipalities:
Hazleton, Pennsylvania; Farmers Branch, Texas; Escondido, California; and Riverside,
New Jersey.” Id. at 406.
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tion rationale applies equally to local AIOHs, which openly target immi-
grants for regulation and facially neutral local AIHOs that have the effect
of policing a person’s federal immigration status.  When a facially neutral
AIHO disproportionately denies a documented or undocumented immi-
grant the ability to occupy a home because of federal immigration status,
the state has unilaterally imposed a condition for remaining in the United
States in violation of the preemption rationale because only Congress can
regulate immigration.  When a facially neutral AIHO’s disparate impact
has the practical effect of regulating the terms and conditions of a per-
son’s federal immigration status, the preemption doctrine applies, and the
conclusion that the preemption analysis does not apply should be
rejected.97
The traditional function of local government in establishing housing
regulations does not exempt AIHOs from preemption when those facially
neutral ordinances are impermissible tools for policing a person’s federal
immigration status in violation of the Naturalization Clause.98  The ex-
press power given to Congress in the Naturalization Clause cannot be
undermined by an AIHO, which is justified by the rationale that a tradi-
tional local governmental role regarding housing ordinances allows it to
regulate immigration without the express approval of Congress.  Unlike
one commentator, I believe immigrant-rights activists should challenge
occupancy ordinances that are a traditional part of property maintenance
codes because the preemption doctrine also applies to facially neutral lo-
cal AIHOs that are effective tools for specifically regulating the federal
immigration status of undocumented immigrants.99  Because immigration
is always related to the conduct of foreign affairs,100 local and state
AIHOs are inherently preempted when they have a disparate, hostile im-
97. Id. at 431–32 (calling for Congress to pass legislation which would put immigration
within the first and second tests under preemption doctrine so as to bolster challenges to
AIHOs under that theory).
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (Congress shall have exclusive power “[t]o establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies through-
out the United States”).  “The textual sources that have been identified at various times by
the Supreme Court as giving rise to the immigration power[—]the Naturalization Clause,
the Foreign Affairs Clauses, and the Commerce Clause[—]were intended to be and have
been treated by courts as establishing exclusively federal powers.”  Pham supra note 92, at
988.
99. See Guzma´n, supra note 32, at 404, 424 (arguing that “activists challenging occu-
pancy ordinances that are ordinarily a part of property maintenance codes are unable to
make use of preemption doctrine in their challenges because occupancy ordinances do not
specifically single out any group of people”).
100. See Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and the
Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (“[A]ny
policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in
regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a repub-
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pact on persons living in the United States because of their undocu-
mented immigration status.
As discussed above, more than 135 years ago in Chy Lung v. Freeman,
the Supreme Court properly recognized the federal government’s author-
ity over immigration as a natural emanation from the federal responsibil-
ity involving foreign policy, and invalidated a California law regulating
Chinese immigration.101  The rationale for the Supreme Court’s holding
in the case was based on its explicit apprehension about the effect state
regulation might have on American foreign policy.102  More than 120
years ago in the Chinese Exclusion Case,103 the Court held noncitizens’
activities, duration of presence in the United States, and immigration sta-
tus constituted foreign policy concerns that only the federal government
had the power to regulate.104  The Chinese Exclusion Case removed from
the states their original responsibility as the most important regulators of
the passage of immigrants.105  Today, it is essential that the immigration
preemption rationale return to its foreign policy roots in order to stop the
increase in state and local regulation of immigration.106  A single state’s
use of its local police power to demonstrate hostility toward an immigrant
group should not place the United States’ national economy at risk of
hostile economic retaliation from a foreign country.
In the contemporary global economy, our national economy is closely
linked to the international financial marketplace.107  The United States’
$457 billion dollar bilateral merchandise trade with China as well as the
fact that Mexico is the second largest U.S. export market supports the
assertion that U.S. foreign commercial activity preempts any individual
state or local community from again acquiring the responsibility to regu-
late immigration.108  The U.S. economy relies a great deal on the inflow
lican form of government.”) (citing Demore V. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521 (2003)
(quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 n.17 (1976))).
101. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1876).
102. Id.; Stumpf, supra note 40, at 1571.
103. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
104. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 605–06
(1889); Stumpf, supra note 40, at 1573.
105. Stumpf, supra note 40, at 1573.
106. Id. at 1570–73.
107. See MARC LABONTE & WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL
31314, CHINA’S HOLDINGS OF U.S. SECURITIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ECONOMY 1
(2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34314.pdf (discussing U.S. depen-
dence on foreign savings and U.S. interaction with China and other markets).
108. WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33536, CHINA-U.S. TRADE
ISSUES 1 (2011), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/167991.pdf (This
figure represents the total trade between countries, imports and exports, for the fiscal year
2010. Id.  China and Canada are the third and first destinations of U.S. export goods
respectively.
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of funds from other nations, such as China, whose enhanced savings rates
facilitate economic growth and finance the federal budget deficit.109  In-
ternational investment in U.S. treasury securities is needed to put money
into programs that encourage economic revival.110  A mishandling of the
immigration issue by a single state or local government entity involving a
citizen from China in 2011 could be detrimental to our national economy.
Due to the importance of American international commercial activity it is
imperative that states be preempted from regulating either foreign com-
merce,111 or from determining the immigration status of foreign citi-
zens112 if lacking the express approval of Congress.  Congress’s
immigration power has been construed to flow from the Naturalization
Clause, the Foreign Affairs Clause, and the Commerce Clause.113  Immi-
gration issues have a presumed effect on U.S. foreign policy and foreign
trade, and the Supreme Court has preempted unilateral state laws regu-
lating immigration even as it approves federal laws that are comparable
to state law, because the United States has only one national voice re-
garding foreign affairs.114
The current political debate over whether federal or local law enforce-
ment should be responsible for enforcing immigration policy115 is easily
109. LABONTE & MORRISON, supra  note 107.
110. Id.
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  “The Congress shall have the Power . . . to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.” Id.
112. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. “The Congress shall have the Power . . . to establish
an uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . . ” Id.
113. Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and
the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1381 (2006) (describing effects of
the federal government pushing local authorities to enforce immigration laws).  There is
agreement amongst scholars and courts that the authority to regulate immigration exclu-
sively lies with the federal government. Id. The immigration powers are not enumerated
in the constitution, however it has been recognized that the federal government has sole
control over immigration issues. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Christopher Carlberg, Note, Cooperative Noncooperation: A Proposal for an
Effective Uniform Noncooperation Immigration Policy for Local Governments, 77 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 740, 753–55 (2009) (presenting an in-depth discussion of the current politi-
cal debate).  Noncooperation policies are created in an attempt to keep local law enforce-
ment from interfering with federal enforcement of immigration laws. Id. at 742.
Furthermore, noncooperation laws encourage undocumented immigrants to report crime
to local enforcement, without fear of deportation. Id. at 748–49.  Those in favor of non-
cooperation laws state that this will help local law enforcement fight crime, because it
would increase the amount of crimes reported by undocumented aliens. Id. at 753.  Un-
documented aliens are frequently the victims of “crime, fraud, and exploitation.” Id. at
741. This is because they are easy to prey on, since criminals know they have a fear of
reporting crimes and facing possible deportation. Id. Those opposed to noncooperation
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resolved in favor of federal preemption when immigration policy is prop-
erly regarded as foreign policy.  There are approximately twelve million
undocumented immigrants now living in this country without documenta-
tion116 most having violated federal mmigration laws by either coming to
the United States or by staying longer than permitted under a legally ac-
quired visa.117  One commentator has concluded that local governments
cannot wait on comprehensive federal immigration reform before regu-
lating the presence of the many undocumented immigrants who live in
their communities now.118  Furthermore, they argue that an individual
state’s attempt to regulate the presence of an immigrant in the commu-
nity in a humane and non-hostile manner is not likely to place the United
States’ international economic interest at risk.  But this is a falsity be-
cause even adoption of local immigration rules that are friendly to un-
documented immigrants undermines the federal government’s ability to
speak as one voice on foreign policy.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PREEMPTION ISSUE: WHERE STATE LAWS
OR POLICIES RELATING TO IMMIGRANTS ARE IN
CONFORMITY WITH THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
In a recent case concerning students unlawfully attending post-secon-
dary schools in the United States, the California Supreme Court held that
California Education Code Section 68130.5 (Section 68130.5)119 could ex-
laws argue that this avoids federal immigration laws and will continue to allow undocu-
mented immigrants to enter illegally. Id. at 753.  However, there have been attempts on
the federal level “to discourage local governments from enacting noncooperation laws.”
Id. at 754.
116. Jerry Markon, Obama Administration Widens Challenges to State Immigration
Laws, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-admin-
istration-widens-challenges-to-state-immigration-laws/2011/09/28/gIQA8HgR7K_story.
html.  Opponents of illegal immigration have stated a couple reasons as to why there is a
high number of illegal immigrants residing in the country.  Several advocates who support
strict immigration laws have stated that a contribution to the number of illegal immigrants
who have remained here has been the decision by the Obama administration to stop “high-
profile raids.”  Julia Preston, 11.2 Million Illegal Immigrants in U.S. in 2010, Report Says;
No Change from ’09, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/02/us/02
immig.html.  It is possible that the decision to thwart “work-site enforcements” has an
effect of attracting illegal immigrants to stay in the country because they feel less
threatened. Id. Additionally, opponents of illegal immigration have stated that birthright
citizenship, protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, encourages illegal immigrants to
come into the United States and have children on U.S. territory and obtain American
citizenship. Id.
117. Carlberg, supra note 115, at 740–41.
118. Id. at 741.
119. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68062 (Deering 2000); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (Deer-
ing 2011 Supp.).
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empt unlawful immigrants from paying nonresident tuition at California
state colleges and universities.120  The court determined that Section
68130.5 did not violate a federal law that denies a state the ability to grant
preferential treatment for higher educational benefits to undocumented
immigrants on the basis of residence.121  The California Supreme Court
acknowledged that it had received many briefs making policy arguments
regarding the validity of tuition exemption for undocumented immigrant
college students.122  Whether Congress’s ban against preferential treat-
ment or the California Legislature’s exemption is respectable and decent
public policy is not for the court to decide.123
Although the United States Supreme Court has not openly tackled the
issue of undocumented students and higher education, Beverly Rich as-
serted that the Court addressed a similar problem involving undocu-
Notwithstanding any other provision of law: (a) A student, other than a nonimmigrant
alien within the meaning of paragraph (15) of subsection (a) of Section 1101 of Title 8
of the United States Code, who meets all of the following requirements shall be ex-
empt from paying nonresident tuition at the California State University and the Cali-
fornia Community Colleges: (1) High school attendance in California for three or
more years. (2) Graduation from a California high school or attainment of the
equivalent thereof. (3) Registration as an entering student at, or current enrollment at,
an accredited institution of higher education in California not earlier than the fall
semester or quarter of the 2001-02 academic year. (4) In the case of a person without
lawful immigration status, the filing of an affidavit with the institution of higher educa-
tion stating that the student has filed an application to legalize his or her immigration
status, or will file an application as soon as he or she is eligible to do so. (b) A student
exempt from nonresident tuition under this section may be reported by a community
college district as a full-time equivalent student for apportionment purposes. (c) The
Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges and the Trustees of the
California State University shall prescribe rules and regulations for the implementa-
tion of this section. (d) Student information obtained in the implementation of this
section is confidential.
EDUC. CODE § 68130.5.
120. Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 859 (Cal. 2010), cert.
denied, 563 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2961 (2011).
121. 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2006).
Notwithstanding Any Other Provision Of Law, An Alien Who Is Not Lawfully Pre-
sent In The United States Shall Not Be Eligible On The Basis Of Residence Within A
State (Or A Political Subdivision) For Any Postsecondary Education Benefit Unless A
Citizen Or National Of The United States Is Eligible For Such A Benefit.
Id.
122. Martinez, 241 P.3d at 859.  “We have received arguments that [S]ection 68130.5
affords deserving students educational opportunities that would not otherwise be available
and, conversely, arguments that it flouts the will of Congress, wastes taxpayers’ money, and
encourages illegal immigration.” Id.
123. Id.  The Court “must decide the legal question of whether California’s exemption
violates Congress’s prohibition or is otherwise invalid.  We must decide the statutory ques-
tion by employing settled methods of statutory construction.” Id.
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mented elementary and secondary students in Plyler v. Doe.124  Rich’s
discussion of Plyler supports the argument that Plyler could apply to
cases involving either secondary or post-secondary education because by
denying undocumented students a free public secondary education, or by
demanding an increased tuition for post-secondary education, the govern-
mental policy creates a lifetime social–economic status disadvantage re-
quiring substantial justification.125  Under the rationale of Plyler v. Doe,
it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause for either the federal gov-
ernment or a state to impose upon, without substantial justification, a
discrete class of students who are not responsible for their undocumented
immigration status.126  Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion in Plyler
articulated the rationale that the government must demonstrate, at a min-
imum, a substantial governmental interest when it creates a class distinc-
tion that makes education available to children within the community
while denying education to undocumented children that otherwise would
be provided schooling.127  Class distinctions are fundamentally inconsis-
tent with the Equal Protection Clause when they serve as the basis for
deciding which immigrant living in a state receives or is denied an educa-
tion, unless the government demonstrates at a minimum a substantial
governmental interest.128  Classifications involving an unreasonable de-
nial of an equal post-secondary educational opportunity to potential col-
lege students living in a state since early childhood “strike at the heart of
equal protection values by involving the State in the creation of perma-
nent class distinctions.”129  Justice Blackmun reasoned that class, based
on distinctions contained in federal laws, violate the Equal Protection
124. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
125. Beverly N. Rich, Tracking AB 540’s Potential Resilience: An Analysis of In-State
Tuition for Undocumented Students in Light of Martinez v. Regents of the University of
California, 19 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 297, 298-99 (2010); see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 223–24 (1982) (“By denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability
to live within the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility
that they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation.”).
126. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.  “It is thus clear that whatever savings might be achieved
by denying these children an education, they are wholly insubstantial in light of the costs
involved to these children, the State, and the Nation.” Id.  For an argument that the pro-
position of Plyler should be applied beyond post-secondary education to professional li-
censing exams see J. Austin Smithson, Comment, Educate Then Exile: Creating a Double
Standard in Education for Plyler Students Who Want to Sit for the Bar Exam, 11 SCHOLAR
87, 104 (2008).
127. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  “Children denied an educa-
tion are placed at a permanent and insurmountable competitive disadvantage, for an uned-
ucated child is denied even the opportunity to achieve.” Id.
128. Id. at 235 n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 234.
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Clause, except when those distinctions are supported by substantial
justification.130
A. When Preemption Does Not Apply
In Martinez v. Regents of the University of California, the court was
charged with determining whether a California law granting in-state tui-
tion to undocumented immigrants without extending the same benefits to
nonresidents violated 8 U.S.C. Section 1623(a).131  Section 1623 limits
preferential treatment for undocumented immigrants in receipt of higher
education benefits based on state residencey.132  The Section states:
(a) In general. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an alien
who is not lawfully present in the United States shall not be eligible
on the basis of residence within a State (or a political subdivision) for
any postsecondary education benefit unless a citizen or national of
the United States is eligible for such a benefit (in no less an amount,
duration, and scope) without regard to whether the citizen or na-
tional is such a resident.133
Martinez centered on California Education Code Section 68130.5 that
grants an exemption from paying out-of-state tuition to students who at-
tended high school in California for a minimum of three years and who
met other, additional requirements.134  Because not everyone who at-
tended a California high school for three years would qualify as a Califor-
nia resident for purposes of in-state tuition and some unlawful aliens who
would have qualified as a resident, but for their unlawful status, are enti-
tled to the exemption, the California Supreme Court decided the tuition
fee exemption was not based on California residency.135  According to
the logic of the California Supreme Court, since the exemption is based
130. Id. at 233-34.
[W]hen a State provides an education to some and denies it to others, it immediately
and inevitably creates class distinctions of a type fundamentally inconsistent with [the
equal protection of the laws].  Children denied an education are placed at a perma-
nent disadvantage, for an uneducated child is denied even the opportunity to achieve.
And when those children are members of an identifiable group, that group – through
the State’s action – will have been converted into a discrete underclass.
Id. at 234.
131. Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 859 (Cal. 2010), cert.
denied, 563 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2961 (2011).
132. 8 U.S.C. § 1623 (2006).
133. Id.
134. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (Deering 2011 Supp.).
135. Martinez, 241 P.3d at 860.
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on criteria other than residency, the provision in Section 68130.5 is not
preempted by 8 U.S.C Section 1623(a).136
Ralph W. Kasarda, a Staff Attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation,
takes the position that state laws granting in-state tuition to illegal aliens
are expressly preempted by 8 U.S.C. Section 623(a)’s limitation on pref-
erential educational benefits for undocumented immigrants and 8 U.S.C.
Section 1601’s restriction on welfare benefits for immigrants.137  Because
as many as 6,000 unlawful aliens would benefit from Section 68130.5,
whereas just 500 legal, nonresident students would benefit, some have
concluded that Section 68130.5 is a de facto education benefit based on
residency and preempted by the federal statute.138  Kasarda contends that
Section 68130.5 conflicts with federal preemption policy in the field of
immigration by “providing a perverse form of affirmative action to illegal
aliens in the form of in-state tuition” if the undocumented immigrant can
pass the implied defacto residency test.139
In Martinez, the plaintiffs claimed to be U.S. citizens, who were either
current or former students paying nonresident tuition at a California pub-
lic university or college, and that they were unlawfully deprived of an
136. See id. at 864 (noting that because nonresidents may qualify for the exemption
rules from the possibility that the exemption is based on residence alone, and pointing out
that the “other requirements are not the functional equivalent of residing in California”).
137. See Ralph W. Kasarda, Affirmative Action Gone Haywire: Why State Laws
Granting College Tuition Preferences to Illegal Aliens Are Preempted by Federal Law, 2009
B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 197, 212, 222 (2009) (noting that the preemption doctrine requires an
examination of congressional intent).
According to the House Conference Report on 8 U.S.C. § 1621, the intent and effect
of that section is to make illegal aliens “ineligible for all State and local public bene-
fits, with limited exceptions for emergency medical services, emergency disaster relief,
immunizations and testing and treatment for symptoms of communicable diseases,
and programs necessary for the protections of life or safety.”
Id. at 222.  8 U.S.C. Section 1601 is a statement discussing the national policy on welfare
and immigration.  8 U.S.C.§ 1601 (2006).  Subsection 7 states that:
With respect to the State authority to make determinations concerning the eligibility
of qualified aliens for public benefits in this title, a State that chooses to follow the
Federal classification in determining the eligibility of such aliens for public assistance
shall be considered to have chosen the least restrictive means available for achieving
the compelling governmental interest of assuring that aliens be self-reliant in accor-
dance with national immigration policy.
Id.
138. Kasarda, supra note 137, at 220-21 (elaborating on the fact that the section “be-
stows upon illegal aliens a postsecondary education benefit[—]eligibility for in-state tuition
based on residence,” a benefit not given to U.S. citizens without considering residence).
139. Id. at 222.  If a student can show that she attended a California high-school for
three years, she is eligible for in-state tuition at California colleges. Id.  This residency test
for in-state tuition applies to students regardless of whether they are U.S. citizens, nation-
als or illegal aliens. Id.
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exemption from nonresident tuition under Section 68130.5.140  The com-
plaint of the plaintiffs included ten causes of action, including field pre-
emption as the sixth cause of action.141  Plaintiffs alleged that if Section
68130.5 was invalid on any of their causes of action, including preemp-
tion, they should be entitled to reimbursement of nonresident tuition fees
in addition to damages and attorney fees.142
In agreement with the court’s decision finding against preemption the
Asian Pacific American Legal Center and eighty other Asian Pacific
American organizations filed an amicus brief in support of the defend-
ants.143  The brief agreed with the line of reasoning, which claims that
because higher education is a typical area of state control, a court apply-
ing the strong presumption against preemption of a state’s valid educa-
tion concern should conclude federal law does not preempt Section
68130.5.144  California, like many other states, has an established history
of controlling its college tuition rates and fees free of “interference from
the federal government.”145
140. Martinez, 241 P.3d at 860.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Application for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief of Amici Curiae
Asian Pacific American Legal Center and 80 Asian Pacific American Organizations in
Support of Respondents and Defendants the Regents the Univ. of Calif. et al., Martinez,
241 P.3d 855 (2009) (No. S167791), 2009 WL 3563895.
144. Paul S. Chan et al., Application for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief
of Amici Curiae Asian Pacific American Legal Center and 80 Asian Pacific American Orga-
nizations in Support of Respondents and Defendants the Regents the Univ. of Calif. et al., 15
ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 52, 68 (Fall/Spring 2009–10) (citing Md. Stadium Auth. v. Ellerbe
Becket Inc., 407 F.3d 255, 265 (4th Cir. 2005)).  “Because California and other states tradi-
tionally have regulated the levels of tuition and fees charges to students at their public
colleges and universities, federal laws that intrude upon these state educational concerns
must be narrowly construed, and the Court must apply a strong presumption against pre-
emption of state law.” Id; see Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-011 v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426,
428–29, 432, 436 (2002) (refusing to extend the federal government’s right, under the Fam-
ily Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), to regulation education records
to the practice of peer grading).  The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, stating:
The Court of Appeals’ logic does not withstand scrutiny.  Its interpretation, further-
more, would effect a drastic alteration of the existing allocation of responsibilities be-
tween [s]tates and the National Government in the operation of the Nation’s schools.
We would hesitate before interpreting the statute to effect such a substantial change in
the balance of federalism unless that is the manifest purpose of the legislation.  This
principle guides our decision.
Id. at 432; see Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 95 P.3d 422, 429 (Cal. 2004) (noting the assump-
tion that traditional state powers are not superseded by federal law in cases where federal
preemption of state law is claimed).
145. Chan et al., supra note 144.
704 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 14:679
The field theory of preemption does not apply to Section 68130.5.146
Congress has not demonstrated intent to regulate the area involving in-
state higher education tuition fees.147  A federal court has appropriately
concluded that federal law, as a general matter, does not regulate the
college admissions process, and that Congress has failed to enact legisla-
tion regarding the eligibility of undocumented immigrants for admission
in public post-secondary education.148  It disregards logic to presume that
by passing federal conditions for non-immigrant foreign nationals to
enter the United States to engage in a line of study, Congress left states
without authority to refuse admission to undocumented immigrants—a
group that unquestionably contains a number of people who evaded the
student visa procedure by entering and living in this country illegally.149
At a bare minimum, Congress has not completely occupied the field of
alien’s access to post-secondary education through immigration legisla-
tion150 prohibiting post-secondary education benefits to unlawful aliens
on the basis of residence within a state.151
In deciding Martinez v. Regents of the University of California, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court said that although federal immigration authority is
exclusive, it is incorrect to conclude that any and all state regulations
touching on aliens are preempted.152  The exclusive rationale of the pre-
emption doctrine routinely applies when the state statute regulates immi-
gration by deciding who is permitted to enter the country and the
circumstances or environment under which a legal entrant has the ability
to stay.153  After suggesting the usual rules of preemption analysis apply
only to lawful entrants the California Supreme Court proceeded to apply
the usual rules of preemption to the Section 68130.5 grant of education
benefits to students unlawfully present in America154  Under the rules of
preemption, a state law is displaced if affirmative congressional action
146. See id. at 68-69 (noting that because regulation of education has traditionally
been up to the state of California Section 68130.5 does not apply).
147. Debra Urteaga, California Dreaming: A Case to Give States Discretion in Provid-
ing In-State Tuition to Its Undocumented Students, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 721, 737
(2011) (citing Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585, 605 (E.D. Va. 2004).
148. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 605.
149. Id. at 606.
150. See 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2006) (asserting that an undocumented alien isn’t eligible
for secondary education based on residence unless a citizen is eligible when residence is
not an issue).
151. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585 at 606.
152. Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 861 (Cal. 2010), cert.
denied, 563 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2961 (2011).
153. Id. at 861–62.
154. Id. at 862.
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requires removal of the state law.155  In view of the fact that Section
68130.5  fails to regulate who can enter; or stay in the United States, the
California Supreme Court moved forward with its analysis under the
standard preemption rules.156
Because a number of states have laws similar to Section 68130.5, the
Supreme Court of California’s decision to utilize standard preemption
rules in deciding the applicability of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)157 is an important precedent.158
The California Supreme Court’s preemption analysis is important be-
cause the states of California, Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, New York,
Oklahoma, New Mexico, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin have
all enacted the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors
(hereinafter DREAM Acts), which are similar to Section 68130.5 and
grant in-state tuition rates to unlawful immigrants without extending the
same benefit to non-residents.159  Professor Oas contends Section 68130.5
and the other ten states with local DREAM Acts allow states to decide
their own residency guidelines for the objective of establishing who is
permitted to receive in-state tuition for higher education, which is in total
disregard of IIRIRA’s requirement to grant in-state tuition benefits to
nonresident students whenever it is granted to students not lawfully pre-
sent in the United States.160
B. Impact of Federal Legislation
The failure to enact the federal DREAM Act of 2010 represents a con-
tinuing chain of unsuccessful federal legislative attempts to provide an
avenue towards citizenship for undocumented immigrants transported to
the United States as children, either by way of acquiring a degree from a
college or in the course of military service.161  State legislation on the
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C.).
158. Professor Denise Oas describes this as a “total disregard for the provisions of the
Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).”  Denise Oas,
Immigration and Higher Education: The Debate Over In-State Tuition, 79 UMKC L. REV.
877, 880 (2011).
159. Id.
160. Id.; 110 Stat. at 3009-672 (codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1623).
161. DREAM Act of 2010, S. 3992, 111th Cong. §§ 4, 6 (2010); Elisha Barron, Recent
Development: The Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, 48
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 623, 623 (2011).  If passed, the DREAM Act would have permitted the
cancellation of deportation proceedings against children who entered the United States
before age sixteen, remained for at least five years, demonstrated good moral character,
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subject of post-secondary education benefits for unlawful immigrants
originated more than ten years ago in Texas.162  In 2001, Texas adopted
H.B. 1403 (Texas Dream Act) as a reaction to federal limitations on an
undocumented student’s right to use in-state tuition; the Bill provides
specified immigrant students with “residency” in order to qualify for in-
state tuition.163  The Supreme Court has declined to review objections to
the Texas law and other state statutes giving students unlawfully present
in the United States residency in order to let them qualify for in-state
tuition rates.164  “After the 2010 DREAM Act failed to get through the
Senate, several state legislators introduced legislation at the state level
that would make undocumented students who attended state high schools
and whose parents paid taxes in the state eligible for in-state tuition.”165
One perceptive and discerning commentator correctly concludes that to
establish qualifications for in-state tuition by considering local high
school attendance, as an alternative to residency, these state laws escape
the 1996 law that clearly prohibits states from offering in-state tuition
based on residency to immigrants unlawfully present in the United States
unless they offer the same benefits to all students, no matter which state
citizenship they might possess.166  In Martinez v. Regents of the University
of California, the California Supreme Court upheld Section 68130.5, Cali-
fornia’s version of the Dream Act, because the law was not based on
residency, and it did not violate a single federal law.167  Furthermore, the
and had not been convicted of either a felony or three or more misdemeanors.  DREAM
Act of 2010 § 4.  Additionally, the children must have been admitted to an institute of
higher education or have earned their high school diploma when the act was passed. Id.
The applicant must have completed at least two years and maintained good standing at an
institute of higher education to qualify for admittance as a permanent resident.  DREAM
Act of 2010 § 6.  Furthermore, in order to qualify for residency based on military service,
an applicant must have dedicated at least two years of time. Id. If an applicant is dis-
charged from military service by the date of his or her application, the discharge must have
been honorable. Id.
162. Barron, supra note 161, at 652.
163. H.B. 1403, 77th Leg. Sess. (2001) (codified at TEX. EDUC. CODE § 54.051(m)).  A
Texas resident is defined as an individual who has lived in the state for one year prior to
the academic year, an individual who has graduated from public or private school in Texas,
or an individual who has lived in the state for three consecutive years before graduating
from high school. TEX. EDUC. CODE § 54.052 (2007).
164. Barron, supra note 161, at 652.  For example, the Court rejected an attempt to
overturn “a provision of Kansas law that permits certain illegal aliens to qualify for in-state
tuition rates.” Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1130 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 554 U.S. 918
(2008).
165. Barron, supra note 161, at 652.
166. Id. at 652–53 (2011).
167. Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010), cert. denied,
563 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2961 (2011); Barron, supra note 161, at 653.  Speculation is that if
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court also found that Section 68130.5 was not impliedly preempted by
federal law.168
The issue before the United States Supreme Court in Chamber of
Commerce of the United States v. Whiting was whether IRCA preempted
Arizona’s unlawful immigrant employment law.169  The Arizona law in
question allows the state to revoke or suspend business licenses of em-
ployers that knowingly or intentionally employ unauthorized workers,
and makes it mandatory for every employer to confirm hired employees
are qualified to participate by means of a specific Internet-based system
known as E-Verify.170  In Whiting, the Court concluded that the Arizona
law permitting suspension and revocation of business licenses is covered
by the IRCA Savings Clause, and the suspension, along with the revoca-
tion of business licenses, was not impliedly preempted because the law
fails to conflict with federal law.171  Furthermore, the Arizona law com-
mands that each employer confirm the employment approval of hired
employees via a particular internet-based system simply does not conflict
with relevant federal law.172  The Court’s analysis in Whiting revealed
that a state regulating immigration through its own employment verifica-
tion is permissible as long as the state verification law lacks originality.173
Although the E-Verify program is voluntary under federal law, it could
be made mandatory by a state since federal immigration law only prohib-
its the Secretary of Homeland Security from requiring mandatory partici-
challenged the Texas law would also be upheld.  Rodney Ellis, U.S. Should Follow Texas
and Pass the DREAM Act, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 10, 2010, at B9.
168. Barron, supra note 161, at 653.
169. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 563 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct.
1968 (2011).
170. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-214(A) (LexisNexis 2011).  “E-Verify is an Internet-
based system that compares information from an employee’s Form I-9, Employment Eligi-
bility Verification, to data from U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Social Secur-
ity Administration records to confirm employment eligibility.” What Is E-Verify?, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.uscis.gov (follow “E-Verify
home page” link, then click “What is E-Verify?” in the upper left-hand corner).
171. Whiting, 563 U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct.  at 1976-77, 1985.  The savings clause reads as
follows: The provisions of this section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or
criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ,
or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.  8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2)
(2006).
172. Whiting, 563 U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct.  at 1985.
173. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as Laboratories of Immi-
gration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673, 1706 (2011).  The author of this article emphasizes
that the lack of originality in the Arizona law played a key role in the Whiting decision. Id.
The fact that the Arizona law strongly relied on federal determinations allowed it not to be
preempted by federal law. Id.  “[I]f Arizona had been bolder with its verification require-
ments (for example, by mandating biometric scans of new employees) courts would have
quickly struck down the law.” Id.
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pation in E-Verify to those outside of the federal government.174
Because Arizona is not the Secretary of Homeland Security, this prohibi-
tion does not apply to Arizona.175  The Court made this clear with its
assertion that Arizona’s use of E–Verify was completely consistent with
the federal system: “[T]he consequences of not using E–Verify under the
Arizona law are the same as the consequences of not using the system
under federal law.  In both instances, the only result is that the employer
forfeits the otherwise available rebuttable presumption that it complied
with the law.”176  Even if the consequences of not using the E-verify sys-
tem are the same for the employer under Arizona law and federal law,
the Arizona law should be preempted because Congress’s objective of
unifying and connecting immigration verification determinations is not
easy to balance with the assortment of state and local laws that will de-
velop as result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Whiting.177
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer
wrote that IRCA preempts “‘any [s]tate or local law [that is] imposing
civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws)
upon those who employ, or recruit, or refer for a fee for employment,
unauthorized aliens.’”178  He continues his analysis by stating that be-
cause the “Legal Arizona Workers Act inflicts civil action against those
who employ unauthorized aliens,” the law is within the federal Act’s gen-
eral preemption rule and is preempted because it is not within the federal
statutory exception for covering licensing and similar laws.179  Unlike the
Court, Justice Breyer does not believe the Arizona law falls within the
scope of the Savings Clause of the federal law and therefore, the law
should be preempted.180  The conflicting views among the justices of the
Supreme Court in Whiting strongly supports one commentators insightful
observation that immigration court opinions require a consistent analyti-
cal framework in order to appropriately deal with the contemporary ex-
periments confronting policymakers.181  “There is nothing per se
problematic about the current framework; rather, the problem stems
from confusion caused by the courts’ unpredictability regarding when
174. Whiting, 563 U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1985.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1985–86 .
177. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 173, at 170.
178. Whiting, 563 U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1987 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(h)(2) (2006)).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Ryan Terrance Chin, Moving Toward Subfederal Involvement in Federal Immi-
gration Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1863 (2011).
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deference will be given to the federal government.  The courts need a
body of law with more clarity and consistency on preemption.”182
V. THE UNITED STATES V. ARIZONA OPINION AS AN EXAMPLE OF A
STATE LAW VIOLATING THE LAW OF PREEMPTION BY
REGULATING IMMIGRATION INDEPENDENT OF
FEDERAL APPROVAL
The issue at the center of the United States v. Arizona case is whether
Arizona’s Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act
(S.B. 1070) violates the Supremacy Clause because it is preempted by the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).183  S.B. 1070 requires that police
officers check a person’s immigration status and enforce civil and crimi-
nal liability independent of federal approval.184  While considering the
validity of S.B. 1070, a federal appeals court utilized the obstacle of pre-
emption theory to help decide whether Congress intended to preempt
any or all of the provisions contained in S.B. 1070.185  Obstacle preemp-
tion occurs when the challenged state law provides “‘an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.’”186
The United States brought action against Arizona to challenge the con-
stitutionality of S.B. 1070.187  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
analyzed the congressional intent of the federal government as it related
to the contested provisions of S.B. 1070 in order to determine whether
the statute was preempted by the federal government under relevant fed-
eral law.188  Under obstacle preemption, the general issue is whether any
provisions of S.B. 1070 are an impediment to the implementation of the
intent of Congress.189
Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070 states that any person shall have his immigra-
tion status determined prior to release, and the immigration status shall
be verified by the federal government.190  Under 8 U.S.C. Section 1357,
182. Id.
183. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 343–44 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 565
U.S. __ (2011).
184. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), amended by H.B. 2162, 49th
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
185. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 345.
186. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
187. Id. at 344.
188. Id. at 344–45.  The court is to first consider Congress’s purpose.  Id. at 345.  Then,
the court, must assume that the police powers if the States were not superseded unless it is
was clearly what Congress intended. Id.
189. Id. at 345.
190. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010); Arizona, 641 F.3d at 346.
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Congress speaks on the issue of under what conditions state officials may
assist the federal government in enforcing immigration laws.191  The court
determined that this provision of the U.S. Code illustrates that states are
to be “involved in the enforcement of immigration laws” only under close
supervision by the Attorney General.192  S.B. 1070 Section 2(B) places
independent state law obligations on state and local officers relating to
federal immigration status without supervision by the Attorney General,
which conflicts with Congress’s intent of allowing officials to regulate im-
migration only when they are closely supervised by the Attorney
General.193
S.B. 1070 Section 2(B) is an obstacle to the constitutional goal of al-
lowing Congress and the President of the United States to speak with one
voice on immigration because immigration is inherently linked to foreign
affairs.194  Reports indicate S.B. 1070 has been viewed negatively in the
international community.195  Foreign leaders from many nations, includ-
ing Mexico, Brazil, and human rights experts from the United Nations,
have publically criticized S.B. 1070.196  Those opposed to the law have
191. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(3) (2006); Arizona, 641 F.3d at 348.
192. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 348.  The court further states that:
Not only must the Attorney General approve of each individual state officer, he or she
must delineate which functions each individual officer is permitted to perform, as evi-
denced by the disjunctive “or” in subsection (g)(1)’s list of “investigation, apprehen-
sion, or detention,” and by subsection (g)(5). An officer might be permitted to help
with investigation, apprehension and detention; or, an officer might be permitted to
help only with one or two of these functions. Subsection (g)(5) also evidences Con-
gress’s intent for the Attorney General to have the discretion to make a state officer’s
help with a certain function permissive or mandatory. In subsection (g)(3), Congress
explicitly required that in enforcing federal immigration law, state and local officers
“shall” be directed by the Attorney General. This mandate forecloses any argument
that state or local officers can enforce federal immigration law as directed by a
mandatory state law.
Id. at 348–49.
193. Id. at 350.  The imposition of mandatory duties on local and state officers creates
an interference with the authority that the federal government has to implement its law
enforcement strategies. Id. at 351–52.
194. Id. at 352.  Arizona’s Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods
Act is an attempt to hijack Congress’s discretionary role delegated to the executive branch.
Id.
195. Id. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 377 (2000) (stating
that when a state law minimizes the federal statute’s commands, such state law is an obsta-
cle to the execution of the intent of Congress).
196. Arizona, 641 F.3d. at 353.  As a result of S.B. 1070, five of the six Mexican Gov-
ernors declined invitations to attend the U.S.–Mexico Border Governors’ Conference held
in Phoenix, Arizona, September 8–10, 2010. Id.  Moreover, “the Mexican Senate has post-
poned review of a U.S.–Mexico agreement on emergency management cooperation to deal
with natural disasters.” Id.
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called it an “an open invitation for harassment and discrimination against
Hispanics regardless of their citizenship status.”197  Other critics argue
that the law cultivates racial profiling.198  The Justice Department be-
lieves the fair treatment of foreign nationals present in America will serve
to improve our foreign relations with other countries.199  In the interest
of managing foreign relations with one national voice, the Constitution’s
grant of the power to Congress to establish uniform rules of naturaliza-
tion200 and regulate commerce with the foreign nations201 preempts S.B.
1070’s local attempt to regulate immigration.
If Arizona is allowed to enact a law placing obligations on state and
local officers free of supervision by the appropriate federal official relat-
ing to federal immigration status, there is the real “threat of [fifty] states
layering their own immigration enforcement rules on top of the
INA . . . .”202  This threat would undermine Congress’s power to regulate
immigration by individual power grabs by the states wishing to occupy
that field at the local level.203  In the field of immigration, S.B. 1070 Sec-
197. Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2010 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html.
“[P]roponents and critics alike said [the law] was the broadest and strictest immigration
measure in generations . . . .” Id.  “Mexico’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement that it
was worried about the rights of its citizens and relations with Arizona.” Id.
198. What Does Arizona’s Immigration Law Do?, CNN (Apr. 23, 2010), http://articles.
cnn.com/2010-04-23/politics/immigration.faq_1_arizona-immigration-law-reform-SB10
70?_s=PM:POLITICS.  The American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona argues that “most
police officers don’t have enough training to look past race while investigating a person’s
legal status.” Id.
199. See Heather Mac Donald, Preemption and Prosecutorial Discretion: A Response
to Andy McCarthy, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/
242219/preemption-and-prosecutorial-discretion-response-andy-mccarthy-heather-mac-
donald (listing immigration objectives the Department of Justice believes will be harmed
by S.B. 1070).  The author argues that the list of items, such as facilitating trade and com-
merce, will not be harmed by S.B. 1070. Id.
200. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.  “The Congress shall have power to . . . establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization.” Id.
201. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.  “The Congress shall have power to . . . regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.” Id.
202. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d. 339, 354 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining how state
statutes may decrease the control federal immigration agencies have over enforcement of
the federal immigration statute).
203. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001) (involving
conflict between federal FDA regulations and state tort actions).  The Court held that
“fraud-on-the-agency” state tort claims “would exert an extraneous pull on the scheme
established by Congress, and it is therefore pre-empted by that scheme.” Id. at 353.
“Through Section 2(B), Arizona has attempted to hijack a discretionary role that Congress
delegated to the Executive.” Arizona, 641 F3d at 352. See also Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000) (holding that a state act is preempted, and there-
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tion 2(B) is preempted because immigration is in theory and fact a for-
eign affair under the Constitution.
Under S.B. 1070 Section 3, Arizona imposes a fine of “as least five
hundred dollars” and jail time for individuals guilty of willful failure to
complete or carry an alien registration in violation of the United States
Code.204  Title 8 U.S.C. Sections 1304 and 1306 of the INA establish com-
prehensive penalties regarding the failure to comply federal immigration
registration, including a one hundred dollar fine.205  Section 3 of S.B.
1070 is clearly preempted by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304 and 1306 because “where
the federal government . . . has enacted a complete scheme of regulation,
states cannot . . . enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.”206  Since the
federal government has enacted a complete scheme of penalties regard-
ing immigration registration without any mention of state participation,
the preemption doctrine prevents Arizona from enforcing any additional
or auxiliary penalties, such as the fine and jail time independent of fed-
eral immigration registration penalties.207  For these reasons, Section 3 of
S.B. 1070 is also preempted by federal government.
S.B. 1070 Section 5(C) criminalizes unauthorized aliens from know-
ingly applying for work or soliciting work in Arizona.208  The provision
fore unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause, when “provisions conflict with Con-
gress’s specific delegation to the President of flexible discretion”).
204. S.B. 1070 § 3, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), amended by H.B. 2162, 49th
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010); see Arizona, 641 F.3d at 354–55 (“Section 3 essentially
makes it a state crime for unauthorized immigrants to violate federal registration laws.”).
205. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304(e), 1306(a) (2006).
Every alien, eighteen years of age and over, shall at all times carry with him and have
in his personal possession any certificate of alien registration or alien registration re-
ceipt card issued to him pursuant to subsection (d) of this section.  Any alien who fails
to comply with the provisions of this subsection shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and
shall upon conviction for each offense be fined not to exceed [one hundred dollars] or
be imprisoned not more than thirty days, or both.
Id. § 1304(e).
Any alien required to apply for registration and to be fingerprinted in the United
States who willfully fails or refuses to make such application or to be fingerprinted,
and any parent or legal guardian required to apply for the registration of any alien
who willfully fails or refuses to file application for the registration of such alien shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not to exceed
[one thousand dollars] or be imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
Id. § 1306(a).
206. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 355 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–63
(1941)).
207. See id. at 356 (noting that Section 3’s state punishment for a violation of a federal
statute fits within the Supreme Court’s description of proscribed state action within the
arena of immigration).
208. S.B. 1070 § 5(C), 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), amended by H.B. 2162,
49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
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imposes jail time on those in violation.  Under the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Congress decided not to criminalize
unauthorized work.209  During the Obama administration, rather than
criminalizing and detaining unauthorized workers, Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement conducted audits of employee files to fine businesses
hiring unauthorized immigrants and in effect, causing businesses to termi-
nate such employees from work.210  The imposition of jail time proscribed
by S.B. 1070 Section 5(C) for unauthorized work clearly conflicts with the
IRCA, in which Congress chose not to criminalize unauthorized work;
therefore, Congress also preempts this provision.211
Judge Noonan appropriately wrote separately to emphasize the intent
of S.B. 1070 and its incompatibility with federal foreign policy.212  Ac-
cording to Judge Noonan, immigration policy is by necessary implication
a subset of foreign policy.213  It impacts the nation’s interactions with for-
eign peoples and foreign nations.214  In the global economy, immigration
policy impacts the buying and selling conducted by foreigners in
America.215  As the statements of many countries and governmental enti-
ties revealed in this case, what happens to foreigners in Arizona has a
connection to how Americans will be respected and treated in a foreign
209. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).  In National Center, the Court examined the IRCA and the legislative
history behind Congress’s decision not to turn unauthorized work into a criminal situation
when it determined the intent of Congress was not to impose criminal sanctions against the
employee, but to deter illegal immigration by decreasing the number of jobs available to
them.  Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc. v. I.N.S., 913 F.2d 1350, 1367–68 (9th Cir.
1990).
210. Immigration and Emigration, Times Topics, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.
com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/i/immigration-and-emigration/index.html?scp=1&
sq=unauthorized%20workers&st=cse (last updated Sept. 29, 2011).  The Immigration and
Customs Enforcement agency conducted audits at over 2,900 companies in 2009, and by
mid-2010 had collected $3 million in civil fines on those businesses that had hired illegal
immigrants. Id. Furthermore, “[t]he audits force businesses to fire every suspected illegal
immigrant on the payroll – not just those who happened to be on duty at the time of a
raid . . . .” Id.
211. S.B. 1070 § 5(C); United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 358 (9th Cir. 2011), cert.
granted, 565 U.S. __ (2011).
212. See Arizona, 641 F.3d at 366–69 (Noonan, J., concurring) (discussing the consti-
tutionality of S.B. 1070 with a consideration of federal law and Congressional intent).
Judge Noonan stated: “Whatever in any substantial degree attempts to express a policy by
a single state or by several states toward other nations enters an exclusively federal field.”
Id. at 368.
213. Id. at 367 (Noonan, J., concurring).
214. Id.  “[W]hat is done to foreigners here has a bearing on how Americans will be
regarded and treated abroad.” Id.
215. Id.
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country.216  “The foreign policy of the United States preempts the field
entered by Arizona.  Foreign policy is not and cannot be determined by
the several states.  Foreign policy is determined by the nation as the na-
tion interacts with other nations.”217
VI. CONCLUSION
The lack of congressional intent on the issue of regulating immigration
does not by default create a state right to regulate immigration because
immigration is by its very nature foreign policy.  The unfortunate implica-
tion of the Supreme Court’s holding in Whiting is the unintended invita-
tion to some states to negatively impact foreign policy by discriminating
against employees because of their national origin.
216. Id.
217. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 368 (Noonan, J., concurring).
